The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 Paperback – March 18, 2014

Was World War I inevitable? This splendid and readable book argues that it was not, focussing a series of specific policy choices made by individual national leaders in several different countries. Taken together, these choices unleashed the maelstrom, but Clark suggests that different choices could have been made, and that a different and more peaceful outcome might have followed.This brings us up against two key themes -- or more accurately points of disagreement -- in World War 1 historiography. First, there's what another reviewer succinctly describes as the powder keg vs. the match. The "powder keg" view argues that political and economic tensions in Europe in 1914 were so intense that war was inevitable, making the Sarajevo assassination and subsequent events nothing more than a trigger: had they not happened, something else would have done. The "match" view argues that a general European war was not inevitable, which makes Sarejevo very important indeed.Clark argues that the match mattered a great deal, more by detailing what actually did happen than by presenting counter-factuals. For me, this was a compelling approach. His detailed presentation of the Balkan situation and of Serbian internal politics is particularly enlightening, suggesting that Austria's response was not as irrational as is often assumed. And his discussion of the domestic pressures working on various political leaders taught me a great deal that I did not know. As well as specific issues -- he argues that much of the British military establishment saw a European war as something that could stop Home Rule in Ireland -- he discusses the cultural and even personal pressures that worked on key actors. Overall, he describes a policy environment in which internal communications were poor and lines of command blurred -- an environment in which mistakes were all too possible.Second, there is question of national war guilt, which has been a central issue ever since the Treaty of Versailles put all of the guilt on Germany. This was of course a major political issue in the interwar period, which tended to be pushed aside after World War II. But Fritz Fischer reopened the argument with a bang in 1961; in "Germany's Aims in the First World War", Fischer argued that Germany planned the war as a step towards European domination, making Hitler's policies a continuation rather than an aberration. The debate that Fischer opened up is still wide open. Some who disagree with him argue that another country (Russia, or France, or England) bore at least a large part of the responsibility, while others argue that war was triggered by a series of mistakes that left all participants (or no participants) responsible. All involved have tended to move towards more nuanced points of view, but big differences persist.Clark's title makes it clear where he stands in this debate: "Sleepwalkers" argues that the war resulted from mistakes rather than intention, though several national leaders were only too ready to move towards the brink. The institutional issues are critical here, in that leaders did not have accurate information, and did not communicate clearly, on a national as well as an international level. Moreover, he describes a situation in which all the major players had belief systems -- different and contradictory belief systems -- which allowed them to convince themselves that highly aggressive actions were in fact defensive.Overall, this is an illuminating and very interesting book. Any historian of course selects and arranges his evidence, and Clark does so quite brilliantly. I am not entirely convinced that the war could in fact have been avoided. But reading this book has certainly shown me how much individual misjudgements and random chance had to do with the war's outbreak,and how much Sarajevo really did matter.

"The Sleepwalkers" is a fluent and scholarly account of the diplomatic and political machinations in the years leading up to the First World War, weakened by occasional blind-spots. Clark only declares his hand in the final pages of the book when he refers to the 'German guilt' arguments of Fritz Fischer and others, since it is Clark's intention to mount a rebuttal to their case. Though the author says that apportioning blame for the war is a pointless exercise, it is hard to escape the impression he considers Serbia, Russia and France more culpable than Germany. Some reviewers have taken strong exception to this view, though both as a corrective to the Anglo- or Franco-centric view of the origins of WW1, and as an argued position, this reader found Clark's contribution valuable.As a professional historian, he trusts an account of events that emphases complexity and competing interests on all sides over any simple, single-dimensional treatment of cause and effect. He writes about the 'hydraulics of power' and 'flarings and eclipses' in the trend towards war or peace in the years prior to 1914, and he does so very well. It may tax the reader's attention at times, as we make our way through the intricacies of Balkan politics, but the author is always in command of the details and his elegant prose style keep us from sinking into the mire.The 'sleepwalker' metaphor is meant to convey Clark's idea that decision-makers were led towards war without fully reckoning on the consequences of their actions; it is a metaphor that can convey the idea a world war was inevitable, even though several times Clark says this was not the case. Hence, my first caveat: in probing the many, many decisions over many years that brought about, in his account, the conflagration of August 1914, Clark tends to give an equal weight to each one, and thereby reduce the importance of the critical decisions of June-July 1914. His purpose is to show that the personalities and circumstances of June-July were a product of earlier crises, plans and impressions, and his thesis is a useful one, but problems arise in the telling over the last third of the book. Most shockingly, he gives no account (p.527) of the process whereby Germany went from deciding to undertake preparations for war to then presenting Russia with an ultimatum that would be the trigger for Germany to declare war on Russia. If Germany had abandoned in 1913 (p. 548) a plan to fight on just one front, against Russia, in favour of a two-pronged assault with emphasis on attacking France first, how are we to understand Clark's discussion of Germany's desire to 'localise' the looming conflict to Austria and Serbia? Similarly, since Germany has already declared war on Russia by August 1st, is Clark justified in giving as much weight as he does (p.527ff) to German overtures after the event aimed at keeping France and Britain neutral? Most of the blind-spots in Clark's narrative tend towards reducing German culpability. In his discussion of important German War Council discussions in 1912, Clark says the view that decisions taken then amounted to a 'countdown to war' is now shared by only a 'minority' of historians. But his footnotes give no references to the 'majority view', which he happens to hold. Elsewhere, he characterises German urgings for Austria to take quicker action against Serbia, following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, as a desire to 'minimize the likelihood of international complications'. Others might argue from the evidence it was motivated by a desire to circumvent possible overtures for peace, and they might wonder, since Clark indirectly acknowledges this elsewhere, why he does not say so here.While there are examples in the book of special pleading for Germany's situation, I would not want to condemn the author or dismiss his account as hopelessly partisan; there is too much else that is judicious, deeply informed, and persuasively argued. Given the mountain of texts devoted to the subject of the origins of the First World War, it would be a miracle to find one that satisfies on all counts. The pleasure in Clark's book is that it goes a considerable way towards recreating the cultural and ideological texture and motivational framework of the Great Powers' decision-making prior to the war, shorn of some of the misrepresentations that weaken other accounts.

Somehow Mr. Clark manages to untangle the incredible web of alliances, intrigue, competing nationalisms and imperialism which drove diplomacy in Europe at the turn of the 20th Century. It is a dense book by necessity, but it is a pleasant, often entertaining read, and always fascinating.You get a real sense of the various assumptions, goals, strategies and paranoias which drove the various empires, why the Germans were continually dismissed, feared and cut-out by most of the other players. The author also gives a great insight into the colorful personalities which were at the center of these national courts.Just a fascinating story, masterfully told.I should point out however: the paperback (shown in the photo) has pretty small type. So for those who can't deal wit that may wish to find a book on tape or an edition with larger type.